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What more can there be to learn about John Marshall?
We have been blessed recently with a flood of fine books about
Marshall and the Supreme Court over which he presided from 1801
until 1835.1 We also now have readily available an impressive collec-
tion of documents concerning the Court before Marshall, as well as a
fine series collecting, introducing, and annotating Marshall's papers.
With recent bicentennial celebrations marking the beginning of
Marshall's career as Chief Justice and the anniversary of Marbury v.
Madison,3 an outpouring of law review articles and scholarly symposia
have offered learned exchanges about the great Chief Justice and his
most famous decision.'
It turns out, however, that Kent Newmyer's5 account of John
Marshall and his times actually illuminates a vigorous current debate.
We are witnessing a bitter fight within the Supreme Court over
federalism, the relative weight to give constitutional text, and the basic
* Dean and Professor, William S. Richardson School of Law, University of Hawai'i.
B.A. 1969, M.A. (Urban Studies) 1972, J.D. 1972, Yale. - Ed.
1. JEAN EDWARD SMITH, JOHN MARSHALL: DEFINER OF A NATION (1996) is a fine
biography that illuminates Marshall's personal life. HERBERT A. JOHNSON, THE CHIEF
JUSTICESHIP OF JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1835 (1997), and CHARLES F. HOBSON, THE
GREAT CHIEF JUSTICE: JOHN MARSHALL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1996) offer many
insights on law and legal doctrine. Two excellent Marshall Court volumes published in the
1980s as part of the Oliver Wendell Holmes Devise History of the Supreme Court of the
United States are invaluable. They are GEORGE LEE HASKINS AND HERBERT A. JOHNSON,
FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801-1815 (1981), and G. EDWARD WHITE
(with the aid of Gerald Gunther), THE MARSHALL COURT AND CULTURAL CHANGE, 1815-
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2. THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
1789-1800 (Maeva Marcus & James R. Perry eds., 1985-1998) (6 vols. to date); THE PAPERS
OF JOHN MARSHALL (Herbert A. Johnson et al. eds., 1974-2000) (11 vols. to date).
3. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
4. See, e.g., Symposium, Marbury and Its Legacy, 71 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming
2003); Symposium, Judging Judicial Review: Marbury in the Modern Era, 101 Mich. L. Rev.
(forthcoming 2003).
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role of judges.6 In a manner that echoes the Court's internal divisions
during the early 1930s, current Justices repeatedly battle about what
the founding generation meant to do in passing, ratifying, and begin-
ning to interpret the Constitution.
Though Newmyer's excellent historical work is anything but "pre-
sentist," it turns out to be relevant as it clearly conveys the constitu-
tional vision proclaimed by Marshall and his fellow Justices. This care-
ful study directly contradicts the state sovereignty claims that have
been made repeatedly by a majority of the current Court. Newmyer
provides a cogent portrait of how John Marshall's charm and legal
craftsmanship forged a vision of balanced federalism. With tenacious
research and crisp writing, Newmyer demonstrates that Marshall was a
committed nationalist, who nonetheless divided sovereignty, respected
the states, and hoped to facilitate individual entrepreneurial efforts.
Yet in service to an expansive national promise - a promise entailing
a constitutional commitment that Marshall did not doubt the Framers
shared - the Chief Justice repeatedly led his remarkably collegial
Court to interpret Congress's powers broadly. He did so "to help
Congress help the people help themselves build a nation" (p. 302).
John Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court synthe-
sizes Marshall's life and his lawyerly approach to a multitude of open-
ended issues. Newmyer underscores the judicial work that Marshall
and his fellow Justices "did best and most often, which was not making
law wholesale but building incrementally through analogy, extrapola-
tion, and matching principle to fact" (p. 288). Of all the writing about
Marshall in recent years, Kent Newmyer's biography is the book most
likely "to endure for ages to come."7
I. COMBINING LAW AND POLITICS, IN A DIFFERENT KEY
Probably the best reason to enjoy reading and reflecting upon John
Marshall and the Heroic Age of the Supreme Court concerns the
book's central issue. Newmyer offers an insightful and often paradoxi-
cal analysis of how a largely eighteenth-century man worked to make
the values of the American Revolution relevant to a new age (p. 271).
Marshall chose to attend closely to the language and structure of the
entire Constitution, while also focusing on practical concerns raised by
the particular case under consideration. Marshall's Court also stands
6. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); Bd.
of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States v. Morrison, 529
U.s. 598 (2000).
7. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 415 (1819).
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apart because of his own remarkable, forward-looking approach to
constitutional adjudication.8
Newmyer illuminates the role of judges such as Marshall who
unabashedly functioned within the realms of both politics and law.
Marshall and his colleagues intended to engage in republican govern-
ance through judicial decisionmaking. It was generally believed that
the Constitution could not be understood without reference to the
common law. Yet what role the common law should play remained
strikingly imprecise. Often, in fact, intense debate about common law
principles and appropriate jurisdiction became "the touchstone of
party division and the focal point of ideological arguments over the
meaning of republican government."9
In contrast to the popular portrait of Marshall as an aggressive and
committed nationalizer, however, Newmyer depicts a beleaguered
champion of the federal union who sought and tried to hold the high
middle ground mapped out by the Framers. If Newmyer may seem to
puff slightly in labeling Marshall's time on the Court as "heroic," his
book concentrates on how isolated Marshall and his Court were most
of the time. Marshall's restraint nonetheless functioned as a key
element of his many achievements. In this respect, as well as in myriad
others, Marshall's entire approach to law and governance sharply
contrasts with the judge-centered activism that dominates the Court
today.
Marshall tended to trust government officials, for example. He
"saw both judicial and congressional power in terms of eighteenth-
century deference, where the officials of government were expected to
govern because they were presumed to be honest and able" (p. 353).
In sharp contrast, the Supreme Court's current corrosive skepticism in
regard to Congress, and even with reference to lower federal judges,
actually evokes the vehement distrust of these same institutions
prevalent among Marshall's most outspoken opponents, such as
Spencer Roane of the Virginia Court of Appeals.
In Newmyer's account, Marshall combined law and politics with
enthusiasm and flair. The law-and-politics combination served as an
important element in Marshall's ongoing effort to follow a common
law approach grounded in experience while aimed toward the future.
This legal experimentation developed through Marshall's clear think-
ing and his striking way with words, as well as his personal charm and
collegial-constitutional jurisprudence. Marshall and his fellow Justices
8. For insightful explication of this approach in McCulloch and other John Marshall
opinions, see CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., THE PEOPLE AND THE COURT (1960) [hereinafter
BLACK, THE PEOPLE], and CHARLES L. BLACK, JR., STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969)..
9. R. KENT NEWMYER, SUPREME COURT JUSTICE JOSEPH STORY: STATESMAN OF THE
REPUBLIC 98 (1985).
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envisioned a national government strong and energetic enough to
promote the general welfare. They also were dedicated to protecting
individual rights such as contract and, preeminently, property -
particularly against state legislatures, which they perceived to be the
primary threat (pp. 271, 318-19).
Marshall, of course, had been directly involved - to the point of
"consanguinity to the Framers" (p. 482) - in the ambitions and con-
cerns of those who fought for independence and who went on to
produce and ratify the Constitution. Before he even reached the
Court, Marshall had been a Revolutionary War soldier and an aide to
General George Washington; a distinguished Virginia lawyer and poli-
tician; a member of the Virginia ratifying convention who strongly
favored the federal Constitution; a charming politician who broke
ranks with his party, opposed the Alien and Sedition Acts, and got
elected to Congress; a foreign diplomat celebrated for his role in the
XYZ affair; and John Adams's Secretary of State (when that depart-
ment was in charge of most of the federal government as well as inter-
national affairs) (pp. 1-145). It is thus hardly surprising that Marshall
seemed to himself and many others to be extraordinarily well-
positioned to understand the Constitution.
As Chief Justice, Marshall liked to bolster his opinions by pointing
out specific ways in which the Articles of Confederation launched a
national government too weak to serve the interests of its citizens. By
contrast, as the written manifestation of a grand national experiment,
the Constitution "armed the agents of the 'American people' with real
'power' "(p. 309). Moreover, Marshall strongly believed that "[t]he
Union was in danger from the states and from a persistent cultural
localism, not the other way around" (p. 299).
Marshall and his colleagues were not shy about practicing their
pioneering mixture of law and politics from the bench. For them, this
also meant acknowledging that the Constitution could confine judges
and that it required great deference to other branches of government
(pp. 253, 282-83, 309-10). It was the will of the American people,
expressed through the promises of the grand constitutional experi-
ment, that they believed they had to vindicate. On the other hand, the
American people spoke regularly through elections and the actions of
their elected representatives in Congress and the Executive.
Therefore, the Court would and could intervene only hesitantly and
only when required to do so, with due regard to whether an interven-
tion made practical, political sense. °
In contrast to current Supreme Court Justices, Marshall's direct
experience in, and concern for, representative governance made him
10. See Maeva Marcus, Is the Supreme Court a Political Institution? (presented at Bos-
ton College Law School Legal History Workshop on Mar. 20, 2003) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author).
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quite deferential toward Congress and even toward the Executive.
This was so even in the context of Marbury, despite Marshall's
somewhat dubious holding as to the unconstitutionality of Section 13
of the Judiciary Act of 1789. Much of Marshall's compelling language
in Marbury, and most of his remarkable strategic moves to get the
Court out of an extremely tight political corner," suggest deference to
the political branches in matters broadly defined as political. Yet,
famously, once Marshall proclaimed there to be a clear line between
political and legal matters within the Executive, he seemed to claim
for the judiciary the authority to find that line." (It is noteworthy that
the constitutional invalidation in Marbury stands alone. Not only was
it the only time the Court struck down congressional action
throughout Marshall's long tenure, but it also was the only invalida-
tion by the Court from its inception until Dred Scott.) 3 The Court,
having claimed the power to say "no," could thereafter actually
legitimate Congress's discretionary calls by refusing to invalidate
them. 4 As Newmyer says of Marbury:
Some see the opinion as a victory of law over politics, others as
supremely political, which leads one to wonder whether it was not, like
the Constitution itself, both at once. Like a great work of art, Marbury
yields different meanings to different viewers at different times - which
may be the true mark of greatness. (p. 158)
11. In addition to Newmyer's well-textured treatment, see, for example, Susan Low
Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History, in Marbury v. Madison,
1986 Wis. L. REV. 301; Mark A. Graber, Establishing Judicial Review? Schooner Peggy and
the Early Marshall Court, 51 POL. RES. Q. 221 (1998); and James M. O'Fallon, Marbury, 44
STAN. L. REV. 219 (1992). Senator Albert J. Beveridge was less precise in describing Mar-
shall and his Supreme Court colleagues as "law-givers as well as law-expounders" in his
lively four-volume biography, 3 ALBERT J. BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL 24
(1919), but he similarly stressed that there were many judicial precursors to Marbury.
12. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 166-67 (1803). In Marbury, Marshall
emphasized the need to protect the vested individual right whose existence he had abruptly
just announced. Over and over in Marbury, he insisted that if a court had proper jurisdiction,
the judges could not be blind to their legal obligation to provide a remedy when faced with a
right. Indeed, Marshall proclaimed it to be an essential judicial duty to assure that govern-
ment officials provide legal protection. The obligation imposed on a member of the Execu-
tive Branch to deliver a signed and sealed commission, for example, thus could be consid-
ered an encapsulation of the proper role for all government actors, including judges.
Throughout his judicial career, Marshall insisted further that the Constitution guaranteed
that the nation would act affirmatively to protect the rights of individuals. Thereby, the Con-
stitution afforded new opportunities and produced the release of energy necessary for an
expanding nation to fulfill its great promise.
13. Dred Scott v. Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
14. As Marshall wrote in McCulloch v. Maryland:
But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature
that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are ... carried into
execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the man-
ner most beneficial to the people.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819). See generally BLACK, THE PEOPLE, supra note 8.
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Much the same might be said about the Chief Justice himself, and
Newmyer's book establishes a significant benchmark for judging
judges. Different viewers at different times are sure to assess this book
and its subject differently. Yet Newmyer's biography will remain
significant if history matters when we judge judges and evaluate
proclamations concerning the Constitution's spirit and the underlying
postulates of federalism.
II. PLAY IN THE FEDERALISM JOINTS: A LITTLE HISTORICAL
FOUNDATION
Somewhat grudgingly, Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once
observed that Marshall's greatness lay primarily in being at the right
place at the right time. In reference to Marshall, Holmes wrote: "A
great man represents a great ganglion in the nerves of society, or, to
vary the figure, a strategic point in the campaign of history, and part of
his greatness consists in his being there." 5 It is important to note that
Marshall wrote on a largely blank slate.16 That he had this advantage
makes it more striking how often, as Newmyer points out repeatedly,
Marshall's opinions tended to be relatively modest and to rest on some
middle position rather than to endorse extremes.
This was so even in the Court's famous decisions that dealt with
large and unsettled questions of the authority of the Supreme Court
and the power of the federal government vis-d-vis the states.
Ironically, for example, Marshall's last constitutional law decision was
Barron v. Mayor and City of Baltimore." Newmyer convincingly
argues that this particular concession to state power by Marshall
"reminds one, as it must have reminded contemporaries, that his
15. Oliver Wendell Holmes, John Marshall: In Answer to a Motion that the Court Ad-
journ, on February 4, 1901, the One Hundredth Anniversary of the Day on which Marshall
Took His Seat as Chief Justice, reprinted in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER ET AL., ON JOHN
MARSHALL 129, 131 (1967). Holmes went on to concede, seemingly with a tint of jealousy,
that:
there fell to Marshall perhaps the greatest place that ever was filled by a judge; but when I
consider his might, his justice, and his wisdom, I do fully believe that if American law were
to be represented by a single figure, sceptic and worshipper alike would agree without dis-
pute that the figure could be but one alone, and that one John Marshall.
Id. at 133. One hundred years later, C. Edward White offered an intriguing analysis of this
Holmes-Marshall connection in G. Edward White, Looking at Holmes Looking at Marshall,
7 MASS. LEGAL HIST. 63 (2001).
16. Marshall liked to rely on established practice, however, as he did for example with
powerful rhetorical effect in McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 402, 422-23 (emphasizing the
repeated use and chartering of national banks by Jeffersonians as well as by Federalists).
Nonetheless, when precedents and practice pointed in an inconvenient direction, Marshall
was not above ignoring them - or constructing a useful hypothetical case out of elements of
past decisions less helpful for his purposes. See Bloch & Marcus, supra note 11, at 311-20.
17. 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that individual property owner had no federal
rights claim because the federal Bill of Rights did not apply to the states).
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nationalism had considerable states' rights play in the joints and that
his federalism, like that of the Framers, was rooted in historical
reality" (p. 435).
It would be a serious mistake to overlook the bona fide logical,
textual, and historical arguments Marshall both internalized and liked
to claim in support of his views about what the Constitution was
meant to do. Being faithful to what the people had wrought and
furthering the promise of the Revolution became matters of overrid-
ing importance in his hands. One did not have to be religious
(Marshall apparently was not) to feel something akin to faith about
such matters. As Newmyer earlier wrote of Joseph Story, whose
contact with the Revolutionary War was much less direct than
Marshall's: "To those like Story whose lives it touched the Revolution
was a miracle, a sign of God's grace, a reminder of the covenant."' 8
Even more than Story, Marshall set out to make the promise and the
idealism of that Revolution a permanent part of America's legal and
political landscape.
State legislatures "embodied the worst features of the new
democratic political order" (p. 145) for Marshall. Proponents of states'
rights, most notably Thomas Jefferson but also a majority of
Marshall's friends at the Virginia bar, failed to recall the many ways in
which state sovereignty actually had interfered with the Revolutionary
War effort and now could endanger the peace. Perhaps worse - as
Marshall proclaimed as early as his 1788 debate with Patrick Henry
over whether Virginia should ratify the Constitution - state
sovereignty exemplified in the Articles of Confederation clearly
stripped the nation of the "energy" necessary "to protect the United
States, and to promote the general welfare." 9
III. THE LION IN WINTER
By the 1820s, Marshall was fighting a rear-guard action. Newmyer
notes that the shift in constitutional law usually associated with the
Taney Court in 1837 "really began in the final years of Marshall's
tenure and to some extent with his compliance" (p. 412). Marshall was
conflicted over what he tragically perceived as a division between
morality and law regarding the slave trade (pp. 426-34). He also was
both creative and inconsistent as he wrestled with the legal status of
American Indians and the awful Cherokee removal policy (pp. 440-
58). After the state of Georgia directly defied the Supreme Court by
executing a Cherokee named Corn Tassel in late 1830 (though the
Court had issued and Marshall had signed a writ of habeas corpus on
18. NEWMYER, supra note 9, at 387.
19. P. 57 (quoting Marshall (internal quotation marks omitted)).
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his behalf), Marshall began to develop a new category for Indian
tribes: "domestic dependent nations" (pp. 450-57). He then insisted in
Worcester v. Georgia that the tribes retained sufficient sovereignty to
make treaties with the federal government, yet also that "a weaker
power does not surrender its independence - its right to self-
government, by associating with a stronger and taking its protection."
20
Sadly, Marshall's opinions entirely failed to protect the Cherokee. Yet
Newmyer maintains that Marshall's determination to uphold federal-
treaty obligations to protect the Cherokee against state depredations
- even if his opinions emphasized "the actual state of things" and
required "ramshackle functionalism" in what proved to be a losing
struggle - might have been the "finest moment" for a valiant "old
soldier of republicanism" (pp. 457-58).
Newmyer's extraordinary final chapter offers an intriguing histori-
ography of the Marshall myth as well as a compelling argument for the
many ways in which the "real" John Marshall truly was impressive.
Marshall forged the Court's role out of personal charm and analytic
and verbal brilliance. He built doctrines from experience, custom, and
history. As Newmyer points out in the course of his luminous, bitter-
sweet Epilogue - in which he ruminates provocatively about John
Marshall, the Court, and constitutional law - the Constitution was
"the supreme law of the land, as Article 6 proclaims, and a bundle of
political compromises" (p. 483). Nationalist commitments were
superimposed on a culture that was primarily local, and that remained
that way for many years.
Though Marshall was hardly a "status quo conservative," he
believed that the contours of the Constitution actually did confine
judicial discretion (pp. 253, 481-82). This was generally satisfactory for
Marshall, in Newmyer's view, because "[tihe Framers took on state
sovereignty, as the ratifying debates conclusively show, and Marshall
followed their lead" (p. 483). Yet during his final years, Marshall felt
he had lost the key battle over federalism. And Newmyer agrees that
Marshall wound up "on the losing side of antebellum history" (p. 484).
Though Marshall did a great deal to put the Court at the center of
constitutional debate, "Jefferson and Jackson taught [him] ... that the
Court does not have the final word on the Constitution" (p. 484).
IV. CONSTRUING A CONSTITUTION V. GRASPING AT ESSENTIAL
POSTULATES
To appreciate John Marshall's general approach is to realize how
different and radically activist the current Court now delights in being.
20. P. 454; Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559-61 (1832).
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Neither this Court's startling disrespect for Congress2' nor its aggres-
sive interventions in the name of the dignity of the states can even
begin to compute - as it were - with the constitutional promises
Marshall tried to anchor in context. Even when current Justices
purport to be limited by common law principles, moreover, they
generally endorse a parsimonious view of these principles, quite
inconsistent with what the common law embodied for John Marshall,
who was surely one of the nation's greatest common law lawyers and
judges.22
In construing the common law, Marshall differed significantly from
his friend and colleague, Justice Joseph Story. As Newmyer's earlier
monumental biography of Story makes clear, the much more scholarly
Story emphasized the past and sought to develop theoretically pure,
scientific principles for common law interpretation.23 By contrast,
Marshall brought to judging a frontiersman's strong preference for
common sense over theory (p. 15). Indeed, he willingly, even enthusi-
21. See, e.g., Ruth Colker & James J. Brudney, Dissing Congress, 100 MICH. L. REV. 80
(2001); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, Marbury and Judicial Deference: The Shadow of Whit-
tington v. Polk and the Maryland Judiciary Battle, 5 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 58, 61 (2002) (men-
tioning thirty-three decisions striking down acts of Congress in seven year period from 1995-
2002, constituting one-sixth of entire set of such decisions from the nation's Founding). This
count does not include the many decisions reflecting the Justices' penchant for narrowing
federal statutes into oblivion, as in the remarkably crabbed reading of the Americans with
Disabilities Act. See, for example, cases discussed in Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court
2000 Term - Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. REV. 4 (2000); Aviam Soifer, The Dis-
ability Term: Dignity, Default, and Negative Capability, 47 UCLA L. REV. 1279 (2000); and
Aviam Soifer, Disabling the ADA: Essences, Better Angels, and Unprincipled Neutrality
Claims, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1285 (2003). See generally JOHN T. NOONAN, JR.,
NARROWING THE NATION'S POWER: THE SUPREME COURT SIDES WITH THE STATES
(2002).
22. This has been particularly so in the realm of family law and individual autonomy.
The Court repeatedly has conceded the relevance of substantive due process, but then inter-
preted constitutional rights narrowly in the name of common law limitations. See, e.g.,
Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702 (1997) (emphasizing common law rules against sui-
cide); Cruzan v. Missouri Dep't of Health, 491 U.S. 261 (1990) (pointing to long common law
tradition in support of Missouri's rule forbidding discontinuance of life-sustaining medical
procedures); Michael H. v. Gerald D., 497 U.S. 110 (1989) (stressing "history and tradition,"
anchored in the common law, as basis to reject due process claims of biological father seek-
ing contact with daughter). On the other hand, Newmyer points out that "the law Marshall
practiced was traditional[ist] and instrumentalist at the same time. It was deeply indebted to
the common law for both method and doctrine. It was also instrumentalist as the common
law had in fact always been.... Practicing law was, or could be, a form of governance."
P. 101-02. In the common law tradition that Marshall embodied, "It was not just a matter of
judicial review, but rather the entire institutional and intellectual apparatus of judicial delib-
eration that was relevant." P. 208. Marshall believed that there were "true" legal answers,
but he also understood keenly both the importance of facts and the Court's vulnerabilities.
Justice Kennedy's evolutionary theory regarding liberty claims articulated in Lawrence
v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003), is much closer to Marshall's approach, as is Justice Souter's
effort to approach constitutional law cases with a mode of common law reasoning in Glucks-
berg, 521 U.S. at 767 (Souter, J., concurring), and C & A Carbone v. Clarkston, 511 U.S. 383,
424 (1994) (Souter, J., dissenting).
23. NEWMYER, supra note 9.
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astically, used common law as a means to envision and to shape the
future, rather than as a binding constraint imposed by the past.
Marshall's constitutional opinions concentrated on interpreting the
language of the Constitution in context.24 With great phrasing and con-
siderable 61an, Marshall also proclaimed which issues of construction
were open and which had been foreclosed by practice. Constitutional
answers might be sought through Marshall's identification of (and
with) the thoughts and dreams of the Framers, by consideration of
established practices after the Constitution was ratified, and by the
demands of the future. In his great McCulloch v. Maryland opinion,
for example, Marshall asserted that the first question he posed - "has
Congress power to incorporate a bank?" - could in actuality
"scarcely be considered as an open question."25 Political acceptance of
a national bank over time had validated Congress's power. Even those
such as James Madison, for example, who once vigorously opposed
this national power, had come to appreciate the need for the Bank and
for such power.
Later in McCulloch, however, Marshall maintained that "the ques-
tion respecting the extent of the powers actually granted [to the
national government], is perpetually arising, and will probably
continue to arise, as long as our system shall exist."26 Marshall was
certain that the American people, through the Constitution they had
created for themselves, guaranteed the national government all the
broad powers necessary and proper to promote the general welfare as
future needs arose across the length and breadth of the continent.27
Paradoxically, Marshall's very temerity in invoking law by looking
to the future allowed him to appear to offer potential restraint through
the Court's authority and its specific holdings. Marshall maneuvered
24. Pp. 226, 253, 288, 302, 316. In his massive study of the Marshall Court, Ted White
summarized Marshall's technique as follows: "In each of the great constitutional cases that
came before the Marshall Court a critical word or group of words in the Constitution's text
was recast through [linguistic analysis], converted into a principle, and made applicable to a
situation not explicitly contemplated by the Framers." WHITE, 1815-35, supra note 1, at 8.
The current Court, by contrast, explicitly deprecates context in its proclaimed faith in text,
see, e.g., Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275 (2001), but it also is willing to base its federal-
ism decisions in its perception of "essential postulates," for example, or in some underlying
or overarching sense of the spirit of the Constitution requiring no anchor in the text. See,
e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. South Carolina Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743 (2002); United States v.
Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
25. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 401 (1819).
26. McCulloch, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) at 405.
27. McCulloch may be the best single source for this view, which is a central theme of
Newmyer's book. For Marshall, the Necessary and Proper Clause in Article I, Section 8
clearly was meant to grant broad national powers to Congress and thereby to cure the cen-
tral ills of the Articles of Confederation. By contrast, for example, writing for the majority in
Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997), Justice Scalia denigrated the Necessary and
Proper Clause as "the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action."
Id. at 923.
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masterfully to find ways to balance between his own open, and even
sweeping language and what frequently turned out to be the quite
narrow actual results of his decisions.28 Marshall benefited from the
fact that what constituted relevant sources or traditions was not at all
clear; indeed, many of the still very small number of Supreme Court
precedents had not been reliably reported. Nonetheless, he exploited
this unusual judicial freedom with considerable caution. By contrast,
the current Court's sweeping theoretical views erase precedents and
history with abandon. Today, the Court seems to have little respect for
either the wisdom of the ages, or for contemporary results of national
democratic processes.
V. CONCLUSION
Newmyer ends his fine book by stressing how much Marshall's
name and ideas still command attention on a daily basis "in the actual
work of the Court as it serves the American nation he loved"
(p. 485). In this regard, however, Newmyer may be betraying his own
Midwestern optimism. In fact, Marshall and his opinions are being
badly used and abused by the current Court.
Instead of deference or even respectful consideration of the work
of Congress, for example, today we have ringing proclamations of the
Court's exclusive power.29 These tend to occur within decisions in
furtherance of states' rights abstractions, at times undeterred even
when a substantial majority of the states reject the very claims made
28. Marbury is a famous example of judicial authority through indirection, but there are
many more within Marshall's work product. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824),
for instance, is a great Commerce Clause case in which Marshall "knew that indeterminacy
had its uses, which is to say he pushed nationalism only as far as the moment allowed but not
further." P. 314. For other examples of Marshall's deference to state powers, see, for exam-
ple, Providence Bank v. Billings, 29 U.S. (4 Pet.) 561 (1830) (rejecting claim of implied
immunity from state taxation in a bank charter), and Willson v. Black Bird Creek Marsh Co.,
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (holding that Delaware law authorizing a dam across navigable
creek was not repugnant to Congress's dormant commerce power). Unaccountably, New-
myer mentions a bridge in discussing this case, rather than a dam. P. 410. This appears to be
an extremely rare factual error in a book that is stuffed with facts. Yet, it must be said that
there are an unusual number of nettlesome typographical errors.
Even Marshall's indeterminacy hardly lends support to Justice Thomas's radical re-
reading of both Gibbons and the relevant history of the Commerce Clause. See, e.g., Camps
Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564, 610-40 (1997) (Thomas, J.,
concurring) (rejecting negative Commerce Clause approach altogether); Printz v. United
States, 521 U.S. 898, 937 (1997) (Thomas, J., concurring) (accepting that his view is "revi-
sionist" but arguing that Commerce Clause power does not extend to regulation of wholly
intrastate, point-of-sale transactions); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 593-96 (1995)
(Thomas, J., concurring) (rejecting "substantial effects" on interstate commerce as sufficient
basis for congressional regulation).
29. See, e.g., Morrison, 529 U.S. at 616 n.7 ("[E]ver since Marbury this Court has
remained the ultimate expositor of the constitutional text."); Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000) ("The ultimate interpretation and determination of the Four-
teenth Amendment's substantive meaning remains the province of the Judicial Branch.").
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on their behalf." Moreover, rather than considering history, customs,
and context in defining the constitutional position of Native
Americans, Aleuts, and Native Hawaiians, for example, the Court
pursues a rigid either/or approach to claims of sovereignty regarding
not only federalism, but also in determining the status of native
rights.31 Further, the Court now stands Marbury's crucial right/remedy
connection directly on its head in its pursuit of a historically
unsupportable use of the Eleventh Amendment to protect states from
perceived financial or dignitary harms.32 The contrast with John
Marshall's sense of the Constitution, law, and the role of judges could
scarcely be more dramatic.
There is a final reason to read Kent Newmyer's persuasive account
of John Marshall and his legal world. One comes away somewhat reas-
sured that judging by means of false dichotomies is hardly inevitable.
Common sense and craftsmanship, respect for complexity as well as
sensitivity to context also may make judicial opinions noteworthy.
Newmyer's nuanced portrait of a remarkable judge and of his
extraordinary times, neatly done in dark colors with many shades of
gray, makes this book so compelling. Indeed, it is a "must read" for
anyone seeking to understand our basic constitutional-law-origin
stories. Even if the current Court at times seems downright cynical
about history, text, and context, John Marshall was not. Nor, to our
great advantage, is Kent Newmyer. His book enacts many of John
Marshall's best qualities, and it does so with clarity and verve.
30. Morrison, 529 U.S. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting) (quoting R. JACKSON, THE
STRUGGLE FOR JUDICIAL SUPREMACY 160 (1941)):
The collective opinion of state officials that the Act was needed continues virtually un-
changed, and when the Civil Rights Remedy was challenged in court, the States came to its
defense. Thirty-six of them and the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico have filed an amicus
brief in support of petitioners in these cases, and only one State has taken respondents' side.
It is, then, not the least irony of these cases that the States will be forced to enjoy the new
federalism whether they want it or not. For with the Court's decision today, Antonio Morri-
son, like Carter Coal's James Carter. before him, has "won the states" rights plea against the
states themselves.
31. See, e.g., Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495 (2000) (holding that special election for
Hawai'i Office of Hawaiian Affairs could not be restricted to Native Hawaiians, because
category served as surrogate for racial discrimination in violation of Fifteenth Amendment);
Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775 (1991) (holding that Native Alaskan vil-
lage is analogous to foreign nation, and therefore barred from suing state because of Elev-
enth Amendment); Joseph William Singer, Canons of Conquest: The Supreme Court's Attack
on Tribal Sovereignty, 37 NEW ENG. L. REV. 641 (2003).
32. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); Alden v.
Maine, 527 U.S. 706 (1999). But see JONATHAN ORTH, THE JUDICIAL POWER OF THE
UNITED STATES: THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY (1987) (detailing
frequent abuse of the language and context of the amendment over time); Maeva Marcus &
Natalie Wexler, Suits Against States: Diversity of Opinion in the 1790s, 1993 J. SUP. CT. HIST.
73 (debunking myth of national outrage after decision in Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2
Dall.) 419 (1793), and demonstrating inconsistency of the Court's recent Eleventh Amend-
ment interpretations with history of the amendment's context, drafting, and passage).
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